The one-third law of evolutionary dynamics

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 249, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 289-295

  Ohtsuki, Hisashi ^a   Bordalo, Pedro ^b   Nowak, Martin A ^a,c  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL   (United States)

^c HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Evolutionary dynamics; Evolutionary game theory; Finite population; Fixation probability; Sojourn time

Indexed keywords

EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGY; EVOLUTIONARY THEORY; FITNESS; FREQUENCY DEPENDENCE; GAME THEORY;

ARTICLE; DYNAMICS; EVOLUTION; MATHEMATICAL MODEL; MUTANT; NONHUMAN; POPULATION DYNAMICS; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PROBABILITY; STOCHASTIC MODEL; TIME;

ANIMALS; EVOLUTION; GAME THEORY; MODELS, GENETIC; POPULATION DENSITY; POPULATION DYNAMICS; SELECTION (GENETICS); STOCHASTIC PROCESSES;

EID: 35448977306     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.07.005     Document Type: Article

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