Designing markets for prediction

AI Magazine

Volumn 31, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 42-52

  Chen, Yiling ^a   Pennock, David M ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b YAHOO RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

FORECASTING;

INFORMATION AGGREGATION; MARKET SCORING RULES; MARKET-MAKER; PREDICTION MARKETS; PREDICTION MECHANISMS; SCORING RULES;

COMMERCE;

EID: 79959764358     PISSN: 07384602     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1609/aimag.v31i4.2313     Document Type: Article

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