Composition of markets with conflicting incentives

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 53-62

  Dimitrov, Stanko ^a   Sami, Rahul ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

conflicting incentives; market scoring rule; prediction markets; scoring rule

Indexed keywords

ADVERSE EFFECT; BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM; CANONICAL MODELS; DEGREE OF NOISE; INFORMATION CHANNELS; INFORMATION EXTRACTION; INFORMATION REVELATION; MARKET OPERATORS; MINIMAX STRATEGY; NOISY VERSIONS; PREDICTION MARKETS; SCORING RULES;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; PROFITABILITY;

FORECASTING;

EID: 77954702600     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1807342.1807350     Document Type: Conference Paper

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