Prediction mechanisms that do not incentivize undesirable actions

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 5929 LNCS, Issue , 2009, Pages 89-100

  Shi, Peng ^a   Conitzer, Vincent ^a   Guo, Mingyu ^a  

^a Duke University   (United States)

Author keywords

Mechanism Design; Prediction Markets; Proper Scoring Rules

Indexed keywords

MECHANISM DESIGN; PREDICTION MARKETS; PROPER SCORING RULES; TERRORIST ATTACKS; WORST CASE;

COMMERCE; INTERNET; TERRORISM; WINE;

MACHINE DESIGN;

EID: 76649135490     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_10     Document Type: Conference Paper

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