Information aggregation in dynamic markets with strategic traders

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 253-

  Ostrovsky, Michael ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agreeing to disagree; Arbitrage; Common priors; Efficient market hypothesis; Information aggregation; Prediction markets; Rational expectations equilibrium

Indexed keywords

DYNAMIC MARKET; EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS; EXPECTED VALUES; FINITE NUMBER; INFORMATION AGGREGATION; MARKET PRICE; PREDICTION MARKETS; RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS; TIME INTERVAL;

ELECTRIC CONDUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 77950553758     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1566374.1566411     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (3)

1. P. M. DeMarzo and C. Skiadas. Aggregation, determinacy, and informational efficiency for a class of economies with asymmetric information. Journal of Economic Theory, 80(1):123-152, 1998.
2. R. D. Hanson. Logarithmic market scoring rules for modular combinatorial information aggregation. Journal of Prediction Markets, 1(1):3-15, 2007.
3. A. S. Kyle. Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica, 53(6):1315-1336, 1985.