Information aggregation in smooth markets

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 199-205

  Iyer, Krishnamurthy ^a   Johari, Ramesh ^a   Moallemi, Ciamac C ^b  

^a Stanford University   (United States)

^b Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

dynamic games; information aggregation; prediction markets; risk aversion

Indexed keywords

DYNAMIC GAME; INFORMATION AGGREGATION; MARKET MODEL; MARKET-MAKER; PER UNIT; PREDICTION MARKETS; PRIVATE INFORMATION; RATIONAL RISKS; RISK AVERSION; SCORING RULES; SMOOTHNESS CONDITIONS;

ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

FORECASTING;

EID: 77954724151     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1807342.1807373     Document Type: Conference Paper

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