Collusion-resistant, incentive-compatible feedback payments

EC'07 - Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 200-209

  Jurca, Radu ^a   Faltings, Boi ^a  

^a EPFL   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Collusion resistance; Incentive compatibility; Mechanism design; Reputation mechanisms

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATIONAL EFFICIENCY; CORRELATION METHODS; COST EFFECTIVENESS; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; PROBLEM SOLVING;

COLLUSION RESISTANCE; INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY; MECHANISM DESIGN; REPUTATION MECHANISMS;

STATE FEEDBACK;

EID: 36448976545     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1250910.1250940     Document Type: Conference Paper

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