Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids

Decision Support Systems

Volumn 39, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 241-252

  Yokoo, Makoto ^a   Sakurai, Yuko ^a   Matsubara, Shigeo ^a  

^a NTT Communication Science Laboratories   (Japan)

Author keywords

Double auction; Mechanism design

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER SIMULATION; ELECTRONIC MAIL; INTERNET; NETWORK PROTOCOLS; PROBLEM SOLVING;

DOUBLE AUCTIONS; MECHANISM DESIGN; THRESHOLD PRICE DOUBLE AUCTION (TPD) PROTOCOL;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 10444275085     PISSN: 01679236     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.dss.2003.10.009     Document Type: Article

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