False-name-proof Multi-unit Auction Protocol Utilizing Greedy Allocation based on Approximate Evaluation Values

Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents

Volumn 2, Issue , 2003, Pages 337-344

  Terada, Kenji ^a   Yokoo, Makoto ^b  

^a NTT CORPORATION   (Japan)

^b NTT Communication Science Laboratories   (Japan)

Author keywords

False name proof; Mechanism design; Multi unit auction

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; ECONOMICS; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; INTERNET; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

FALSE-NAME-PROOF; MECHANISM DESIGN; MULTI-UNIT AUCTION;

NETWORK PROTOCOLS;

EID: 1142280946     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/860575.860630     Document Type: Conference Paper

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