Information control, career concerns, and corporate governance

Journal of Finance

Volumn 61, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 1845-1896

  Song, Fenghua ^a   Thakor, Anjan V ^a  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST LOUIS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746861192     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: 15406261     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00891.x     Document Type: Article

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