Enforcement and capacity building in international cooperation

International Theory

Volumn 2, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 32-49

  Urpelainen, Johannes ^a  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

capacity building; compliance; enforcement; game theory; international cooperation

Indexed keywords

EID: 79956250166     PISSN: 17529719     EISSN: 17529727     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S175297190999025X     Document Type: Article

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