Political economy and international institutions

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 121-137

  Snidal, Duncan ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0030100016     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0144-8188(95)00051-8     Document Type: Article

References (75)

1. 1. On theory of the firm see Oliver Williamson Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, New York: Free Press, (1975); Oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: Free Press, (1985); on history see Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1990); on American political institutions see Kenneth Shepsle, "Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions," in ed. Herbert F. Weisberg, (New York: Agathon Press, 1986, Political Science: The Science of Politics pp. 51-81). On law and economics see Richard A. Posner Economic Analysis of Law (Boston: Little, Brown).
2. 1. On theory of the firm see Oliver Williamson Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, New York: Free Press, (1975); Oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: Free Press, (1985); on history see Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1990); on American political institutions see Kenneth Shepsle, "Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions," in ed. Herbert F. Weisberg, (New York: Agathon Press, 1986, Political Science: The Science of Politics pp. 51-81). On law and economics see Richard A. Posner Economic Analysis of Law (Boston: Little, Brown).
3. 1. On theory of the firm see Oliver Williamson Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, New York: Free Press, (1975); Oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: Free Press, (1985); on history see Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1990); on American political institutions see Kenneth Shepsle, "Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions," in ed. Herbert F. Weisberg, (New York: Agathon Press, 1986, Political Science: The Science of Politics pp. 51-81). On law and economics see Richard A. Posner Economic Analysis of Law (Boston: Little, Brown).
4. 1. On theory of the firm see Oliver Williamson Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, New York: Free Press, (1975); Oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: Free Press, (1985); on history see Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1990); on American political institutions see Kenneth Shepsle, "Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions," in ed. Herbert F. Weisberg, (New York: Agathon Press, 1986, Political Science: The Science of Politics pp. 51-81). On law and economics see Richard A. Posner Economic Analysis of Law (Boston: Little, Brown).
5. 1. On theory of the firm see Oliver Williamson Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, New York: Free Press, (1975); Oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: Free Press, (1985); on history see Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1990); on American political institutions see Kenneth Shepsle, "Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions," in ed. Herbert F. Weisberg, (New York: Agathon Press, 1986, Political Science: The Science of Politics pp. 51-81). On law and economics see Richard A. Posner Economic Analysis of Law (Boston: Little, Brown).
6. 2. Much of the best work is by international lawyers familiar with IR regime theory. See Kenneth W. Abbott, "Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers," Yale Journal of International Law 14, 2(1989):335-411; Anne-Marie Burley, "International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda," American Journal of International Law 87 (1993): 205-239; and John K. Setear, "An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and International Law," (Unpublished manuscript, UCLA School of Law, 1995).
7. 2. Much of the best work is by international lawyers familiar with IR regime theory. See Kenneth W. Abbott, "Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers," Yale Journal of International Law 14, 2(1989):335-411; Anne-Marie Burley, "International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda," American Journal of International Law 87 (1993): 205-239; and John K. Setear, "An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and International Law," (Unpublished manuscript, UCLA School of Law, 1995).
8. 2. Much of the best work is by international lawyers familiar with IR regime theory. See Kenneth W. Abbott, "Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers," Yale Journal of International Law 14, 2(1989):335-411; Anne-Marie Burley, "International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda," American Journal of International Law 87 (1993): 205-239; and John K. Setear, "An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and International Law," (Unpublished manuscript, UCLA School of Law, 1995).
9. 3. Lisa L. Martin, Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); Arthur A. Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World" in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Duncan Snidal, "Coordination Versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes," American Political Science Review 79, 4(1985):923-942.
10. 3. Lisa L. Martin, Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); Arthur A. Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World" in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Duncan Snidal, "Coordination Versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes," American Political Science Review 79, 4(1985):923-942.
11. 3. Lisa L. Martin, Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); Arthur A. Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World" in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Duncan Snidal, "Coordination Versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes," American Political Science Review 79, 4(1985):923-942.
12. 4. George W. Downs and David M. Rocke, Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races and Arms Control (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1990).
13. 5. Joseph M. Grieco Cooperation Among Nations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); Joseph M. Grieco (1993), "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation," in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. David Baldwin, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
14. 5. Joseph M. Grieco Cooperation Among Nations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); Joseph M. Grieco (1993), "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation," in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. David Baldwin, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
15. 6. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Andrew Kydd and Duncan Snidal, "Progress in Game-Theoretical Analysis of International Regimes," in Regime Theory and International Relations, ed. Volker Rittberger, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); James D. Morrow, "Modeling the forms of international cooperation: distribution versus information" International Organization 48, 3 (1994):387-424.
16. 6. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Andrew Kydd and Duncan Snidal, "Progress in Game-Theoretical Analysis of International Regimes," in Regime Theory and International Relations, ed. Volker Rittberger, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); James D. Morrow, "Modeling the forms of international cooperation: distribution versus information" International Organization 48, 3 (1994):387-424.
17. 6. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Andrew Kydd and Duncan Snidal, "Progress in Game-Theoretical Analysis of International Regimes," in Regime Theory and International Relations, ed. Volker Rittberger, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); James D. Morrow, "Modeling the forms of international cooperation: distribution versus information" International Organization 48, 3 (1994):387-424.
18. 7. Baldwin, supra, note 5.
19. 8. On domestic politics, see P. Evans, H. Jacobson, and R. Putnam, Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993); on issues see Susanne Lohmann, "A Theory of Domestic-International Linkage," paper presented at the New Games Conference, UCSD, 1995; on number of actors, see Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review 85, 3(1991):701-726; and, on information, see Morrow, supra, note 6; and Downs and Rocke, supra, note 4.
20. 8. On domestic politics, see P. Evans, H. Jacobson, and R. Putnam, Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993); on issues see Susanne Lohmann, "A Theory of Domestic-International Linkage," paper presented at the New Games Conference, UCSD, 1995; on number of actors, see Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review 85, 3(1991):701-726; and, on information, see Morrow, supra, note 6; and Downs and Rocke, supra, note 4.
21. 8. On domestic politics, see P. Evans, H. Jacobson, and R. Putnam, Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993); on issues see Susanne Lohmann, "A Theory of Domestic-International Linkage," paper presented at the New Games Conference, UCSD, 1995; on number of actors, see Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review 85, 3(1991):701-726; and, on information, see Morrow, supra, note 6; and Downs and Rocke, supra, note 4.
22. 8. On domestic politics, see P. Evans, H. Jacobson, and R. Putnam, Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993); on issues see Susanne Lohmann, "A Theory of Domestic-International Linkage," paper presented at the New Games Conference, UCSD, 1995; on number of actors, see Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review 85, 3(1991):701-726; and, on information, see Morrow, supra, note 6; and Downs and Rocke, supra, note 4.
23. 8. On domestic politics, see P. Evans, H. Jacobson, and R. Putnam, Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993); on issues see Susanne Lohmann, "A Theory of Domestic-International Linkage," paper presented at the New Games Conference, UCSD, 1995; on number of actors, see Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review 85, 3(1991):701-726; and, on information, see Morrow, supra, note 6; and Downs and Rocke, supra, note 4.
24. 9. Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," in International Regimes, ed. S. D. Krasner, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 2.
25. 10. Kenneth Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).
26. 11. Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics 43, 3(1991):336-366.
27. 12. Joseph M. Grieco, supra, note 5.
28. 13. Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review 85, 4(1991):1303-1320; Duncan Snidal supra, note 8.
29. 13. Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review 85, 4(1991):1303-1320; Duncan Snidal supra, note 8.
30. 14. James Fearon, "Cooperation and Bargaining Under Anarchy," (Unpublished manuscript, University of Chicago, 1994); Snidal, supra, note 3.
31. 14. James Fearon, "Cooperation and Bargaining Under Anarchy," (Unpublished manuscript, University of Chicago, 1994); Snidal, supra, note 3.
32. 15. Charles Kindleberger, The World In Depression, 1929-39 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); Keohane, supra, note 6; Duncan Snidal, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory" International Organization 39, 4(1985):579-614.
33. 15. Charles Kindleberger, The World In Depression, 1929-39 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); Keohane, supra, note 6; Duncan Snidal, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory" International Organization 39, 4(1985):579-614.
34. 15. Charles Kindleberger, The World In Depression, 1929-39 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); Keohane, supra, note 6; Duncan Snidal, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory" International Organization 39, 4(1985):579-614.
35. 16. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). The ideal of anarchy as an institution-free environment like the Hobbesian state of nature does not transfer perfectly to an international setting where the international system and states themselves are socially and politically constructed. At least one set of institutions, those associated with the state system, are important and unproblematic in realist anarchy.
36. 17. Helen Milner "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory," Review of International Studies 17 (1991):67-85.
37. 18. John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security. 19, 3 (1995): 9; see also Waltz, supra, note 16.
38. 18. John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security. 19, 3 (1995): 9; see also Waltz, supra, note 16.
39. 19. The "security dilemma" is the international version of Rousseu's stag hunt where, although universal cooperation is the best outcome for all, fear that other might not cooperate leads to the tragic outcome that no state cooperates. See Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30, 2(1978):167-214. A balanced discussion of why cooperation is more difficult in security affairs is Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," World Politics 37(1984):1-23.
40. 19. The "security dilemma" is the international version of Rousseu's stag hunt where, although universal cooperation is the best outcome for all, fear that other might not cooperate leads to the tragic outcome that no state cooperates. See Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30, 2(1978):167-214. A balanced discussion of why cooperation is more difficult in security affairs is Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," World Politics 37(1984):1-23.
41. 20. Mearsheimer, supra, note 18, p. 7.
42. Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security 19, 3(1995):50-93.
43. 21. Abbott and Snidal, supra, introductory note.
44. 22. Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); North, supra, note 1; Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
45. 22. Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); North, supra, note 1; Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
46. 22. Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); North, supra, note 1; Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
47. 23. North, supra, note 1, p. 3.
48. 24. In equilibrium, no actor has an incentive to change its behavior given the actions of others and the exogenous institutional setting. When (some) institutions are endogenous, an equilibrium requires that actors find it in their interest to abide by those institutions as well. Thus institutions are not equilibria per se but rather are key aspects of equilibria that are codetermined with other features of the game setting. For an interesting progression in the development and refinement of institutions as equilibria see David Lewis, Convention: A Philosophical Study (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969); Andrew Schotter, The Economic Theory of Social Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Randall L. Calvert, "The Rational Choice Theory of Social Institutions: Cooperation, Coordination, and Communication," in Jeffrey S. Banks and Eric A. Hanushek (eds.) Modern Political Economy: Old Topics, New Directions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
49. 24. In equilibrium, no actor has an incentive to change its behavior given the actions of others and the exogenous institutional setting. When (some) institutions are endogenous, an equilibrium requires that actors find it in their interest to abide by those institutions as well. Thus institutions are not equilibria per se but rather are key aspects of equilibria that are codetermined with other features of the game setting. For an interesting progression in the development and refinement of institutions as equilibria see David Lewis, Convention: A Philosophical Study (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969); Andrew Schotter, The Economic Theory of Social Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Randall L. Calvert, "The Rational Choice Theory of Social Institutions: Cooperation, Coordination, and Communication," in Jeffrey S. Banks and Eric A. Hanushek (eds.) Modern Political Economy: Old Topics, New Directions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
50. 24. In equilibrium, no actor has an incentive to change its behavior given the actions of others and the exogenous institutional setting. When (some) institutions are endogenous, an equilibrium requires that actors find it in their interest to abide by those institutions as well. Thus institutions are not equilibria per se but rather are key aspects of equilibria that are codetermined with other features of the game setting. For an interesting progression in the development and refinement of institutions as equilibria see David Lewis, Convention: A Philosophical Study (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969); Andrew Schotter, The Economic Theory of Social Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Randall L. Calvert, "The Rational Choice Theory of Social Institutions: Cooperation, Coordination, and Communication," in Jeffrey S. Banks and Eric A. Hanushek (eds.) Modern Political Economy: Old Topics, New Directions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
51. 25. For a more technical discussion of exogenity and endogeneity in institutional analysis see Duncan Snidal, "The Politics of Scope: Endogenous Actors, Heterogeneity' and Institutions," Journal of Theoretical Politics 6, 4(1994):449-472.
52. 26. Robert M. Townsend, "Models As Economies," Economic Journal (Conference, 1988)1-24; Robert M. Townsend, The Medieval Village Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
53. 26. Robert M. Townsend, "Models As Economies," Economic Journal (Conference, 1988)1-24; Robert M. Townsend, The Medieval Village Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
54. 27. Posner, supra, note 1.
55. 28. Harold Demsetz, "Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint," Journal Law and Economics 12: 1 (1969): 1-22. p. 19; Kenneth J. Arrow, "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity (Princeton: Princeton University, 1962).
56. 28. Harold Demsetz, "Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint," Journal Law and Economics 12: 1 (1969): 1-22. p. 19; Kenneth J. Arrow, "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity (Princeton: Princeton University, 1962).
57. 29. See Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam, supra, note 8. The analysis is more complicated with respect to institutional design, moreover, since states can change their domestic constraints through international arrangements. The choice of fast-track trade provisions or, alternatively, of incorporating domestic groups into international negotiations, may restructure the constraints in important ways.
58. 30. See Powell, supra, note 13; Grieco, supra, note 5, pp. 312-16.
59. 30. See Powell, supra, note 13; Grieco, supra, note 5, pp. 312-16.
60. 31. Keohane, supra, note 6.
61. 32. George J. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2 (1971): 3-21.
62. 33. Douglass C. North, "Institutions and a Transaction-Cost Theory of Exchange," in Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, eds. J. Alt and K. Shepsle, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
63. 34. Keohane, supra, note 6, p. 87.
64. 35. Steven N. S. Cheung, "Economic Organization and Transactions Costs," in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics ed. J. Satwell, Vol. 2 (New York: Groves Dictionaries, 1987), p. 56.
65. 36. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Declines in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).
66. 37. The parallel in the Coase-Williamson theory is that firms internalize costly transactions whereas low cost transactions are left to the market between firms. Market pressures ensure that the pattern of transactions costs is efficient; equivalent pressures may not exist in other institutional settings.
67. 38. T. Baumgartner, W. Buckley, and T. Burns, "Relational Control: The Human Structuring of Cooperation and Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution 19 (1975): 417-440.
68. 39. Beth Yarbrough and Robert Yarbrough, Cooperation and Governance in International Trade (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 130.
69. 40. See Grieco, supra, note 5; Powell, supra, note 13; Snidal, supra, note 8; and Krasner, supra, note 11.
70. 40. See Grieco, supra, note 5; Powell, supra, note 13; Snidal, supra, note 8; and Krasner, supra, note 11.
71. 40. See Grieco, supra, note 5; Powell, supra, note 13; Snidal, supra, note 8; and Krasner, supra, note 11.
72. 40. See Grieco, supra, note 5; Powell, supra, note 13; Snidal, supra, note 8; and Krasner, supra, note 11.
73. 41. Fearon, supra, note 14.
74. 42. W. Brian Arthur, "Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms in Economics," in The Economy as an Evolving Complex System, eds. P. Anderson, K. Arrow and D. Pines (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1988). The famous, though disputed, example is the history of the inefficient typewriter keyboard that remains in widespread use despite the availability of more efficient alternatives. See Paul David, "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY," American Economic Review 75, 2(1985):332-337.
75. 42. W. Brian Arthur, "Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms in Economics," in The Economy as an Evolving Complex System, eds. P. Anderson, K. Arrow and D. Pines (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1988). The famous, though disputed, example is the history of the inefficient typewriter keyboard that remains in widespread use despite the availability of more efficient alternatives. See Paul David, "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY," American Economic Review 75, 2(1985):332-337.