Lies, defection, and the pattern of international cooperation

American Journal of Political Science

Volumn 50, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 909-925

  Svolik, Milan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748764414     PISSN: 00925853     EISSN: 15405907     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00223.x     Document Type: Article

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