Culture-gene coevolution, norm-psychology and the emergence of human prosociality

Trends in Cognitive Sciences

Volumn 15, Issue 5, 2011, Pages 218-226

  Chudek, Maciej ^a   Henrich, Joseph ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

^b CANADIAN INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED RESEARCH   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CO-EVOLUTION; CO-EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH; COGNITIVE SCIENCE; CROSS-CULTURAL DIFFERENCES; CULTURAL EVOLUTION; EMPIRICAL FINDINGS; EMPIRICAL RESEARCH; FORMAL THEORY; HUMAN EVOLUTION; INHERITANCE SYSTEMS; SOCIAL NORM; SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY;

GENES;

BIOLOGY;

COEVOLUTION; CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY; CULTURAL FACTOR; EVIDENCE BASED PRACTICE; GENETIC PARAMETERS; HUMAN; PREDICTION; PSYCHOLOGY; REVIEW; SIGNAL TRANSDUCTION;

ANIMALS; CULTURAL EVOLUTION; EVOLUTION, MOLECULAR; HUMANS; PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

EID: 79955475002     PISSN: 13646613     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2011.03.003     Document Type: Review

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