The microeconomics of insurance

Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics

Volumn 4, Issue 1-2, 2008, Pages 1-163

  Rees, Ray ^a   Wambach, Achim ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79951499728     PISSN: 15479846     EISSN: 15479854     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1561/0700000023     Document Type: Article

References (101)

1. Akerlof, G. A. (1970), 'The market for lemons: Quality uncertainty in the market mechanism'. Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, 488- 500.
2. Ania, A., T. Tröger, and A.Wambach (2002), 'An evolutionary analysis of insurance markets with adverse selection'. Games and Economic Behavior 40, 153-184.
3. Arnott, R. and J. E. Stiglitz (1988a), 'The basic analytics of moral hazard'. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 90, 383-413.
4. Arnott, R. and J. E. Stiglitz (1988b), 'Randomization with asymmetric information'. RAND Journal of Economics 19, 344-362.
5. Arrow, K. J. (1970), Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. Amsterdam- London: North-Holland.
6. Arrow, K. J. (1974), 'Optimal insurance and generalized deductibles'. Scandinavian Actuarial Journal 1, 1-42.
7. Asheim, G. B. and T. Nilssen (1996), 'Non-discriminating renegotiation in a competitive insurance market'. European Economic Review 10, 1717-1736. (Pubitemid 126393585)
8. Bond, E. W. and K. J. Crocker (1997), 'Hardball and the soft touch: The economics of optimal insurance contracts with costly state verification and endogenous monitoring costs'. Journal of Public Economics 63, 239-264. (Pubitemid 127167166)
9. Borch, K. (1962), 'Equilibrium in a reinsurance market'. Econometrica 30, 424-444.
10. Borch, K. (1981), 'Is regulation of insurance companies necessary?'. In: H. Göppl and R. Henn (eds.): Geld, Banken und Versicherungen, Vol. 2. Königstein, pp. 717-731.
11. Brockett, P. L., R. MacMinn, and M. Carter (2000), 'Genetic testing, insurance economics and societal responsibility'. North American Actuarial Journal 3(1), 1-20.
12. Brundin, I. and F. Salanié (1997), Fraud in the Insurance Industry: An Organizational Approach. Department of Economics, University of Toulouse, Mimeo.
13. Brys, E., G. Dionne, and L. Eeckhoudt (1989), 'More on insurance as a Giffen good'. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 2, 415-420.
14. Chiappori, P. A., B. Jullien, B. Salanié, and F. Salanié (2006), 'Asymmetric information in insurance: General testable implications'. RAND Journal of Economics 37(4), 783-798.
15. Chiappori, P. A., I. Macho, P. Rey, and B. Salanié (1994), 'Repeated moral hazard: The role of memory, commitment and the access to credit markets'. European Economic Review 38, 1527-1553.
16. Chiappori, P. A. and B. Salanié (2000), 'Testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets'. Journal of Political Economy 108, 56-78. (Pubitemid 30199842)
17. Cho, I. and D. Kreps (1987), 'Signalling games and stable equilibria'. Quarterly Journal of Economics 52, 179-222.
18. Cook, P. J. and D. A. Graham (1977), 'The Demand for insurance and protection: The case of irreplacable commodities'. Quarterly Journal of Economics 91, 143-156.
19. Cooper, R. and B. Hayes (1987), 'Multi-period insurance contracts'. International Journal of Industrial Organization 5, 211-231.
20. Crocker, K. J. and J. Morgan (1998), 'Is honesty the best policy? Curtailing insurance fraud through optimal incentive contracts'. Journal of Political Economy 106(2), 355-375. (Pubitemid 128665908)
21. Crocker, K. J. and A. Snow (1985), 'The efficiency of competitive equilibria in insurance markets with asymmetric information'. Journal of Public Economics 26, 207-219.
22. Crocker, K. J. and A. Snow (1986), 'The efficiency effects of categorical discrimination in the insurance industry'. Journal of Political Economy 94, 321-344.
23. Crocker, K. J. and A. Snow (1992), 'The social value of hidden information in adverse selection economies'. Journal of Public Economics 48, 317-347.
24. Cummins, D. (1991), 'Statistical and financial models of insurance pricing and the insurance firm'. Journal of Risk and Insurance 58, 261-302.
25. D'Arcy, S. P. and N. Doherty (1990), 'Adverse selection, private information and lowballing in insurance markets'. Journal of Business 63, 145-164.
26. Dasgupta, P. and E. Maskin (1986), 'The existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games, II: Applications'. Review of Economic Studies 53, 27-41.
27. Dionne, G. (1983), 'Adverse selection and repeated insurance contracts'. Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 8, 316-332.
28. Dionne, G. (2000), Handbook of Insurance. Kluwer.
29. Dionne, G. and N. A. Doherty (1994), 'Adverse selection, commitment, and renegotiation: Extension to and evidence from insurance markets'. Journal of Political Economy 102, 209-235.
30. Doherty, N. A. and H. Schlesinger (1990), 'Rational insurance purchasing: Consideration of contract nonperformance'. Quarterly Journal of Economics 105, 143-153.
31. Doherty, N. A. and P. D. Thistle (1996), 'Adverse selection with endogenous information in insurance markets'. Journal of Public Economics 63, 83-102. (Pubitemid 126160553)
32. Dulleck, U. and R. Kerschbamer (2006), 'On doctors, mechanics and computer specialists - The economics of credence goods'. Journal of Economic Literature 44, 5-42. (Pubitemid 43563710)
33. Eeckhoudt, L. and C. Gollier (2000), 'The effects of changes in risk on risk taking: A survey'. In: G. Dionne (ed.): Handbook of Insurance. Kluwer, pp. 117-130.
34. Eeckhoudt, L., C. Gollier, and H. Schlesinger (2005), Economic and Financial Decisions under Risk. Princeton University Press.
35. Ehrlich, I. and G. Becker (1972), 'Market insurance, self insurance and self protection'. Journal of Political Economy 80, 623-648.
36. Emons, W. (1997), 'Credence goods and fraudulent experts'. RAND Journal of Economics 28, 107-119.
37. Fagart, M.-C. and P. Picard (1999), 'Optimal insurance under random auditing'. Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory 24, 29-54.
38. Finsinger, J. and M. Pauly (1984), 'Reserve levels and reserve requirements for profit maximising insurance firms'. In: G. Bamberg and K. Spremann (eds.): Risk and Capital. Berlin: Springer.
39. Fudenberg, D., B. Holmström, and P. Milgrom (1990), 'Short term contracts and long term agency relationships'. Journal of Economic Theory 51, 1-31.
40. Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1990), 'Moral hazard and renegotiation in agency contracts'. Econometrica 58, 1279-1319.
41. Gollier, C. (2001), The Economics of Risk and Time. The MIT Press.
42. Gollier, C. and H. Schlesinger (1996), 'Arrow's theorem on the optimality of deductibles: A stochastic dominance approach'. Economic Theory 7, 359-363. (Pubitemid 126309501)
43. Gravelle, H. and R. Rees (2004), Microeconomics. Prentice Hall, Third edition.
44. Grossman, H. (1979), 'Adverse selection, dissembling and competitive equilibrium'. Bell Journal of Economics 10, 330-343.
45. Grossman, S. and O. Hart (1983), 'An analysis of the principal-agent problem'. Econometrica 51, 7-45.
46. Harris, M. and R. M. Townsend (1981), 'Resource allocation under asymmetric information'. Econometrica 49(1), 33-64.
47. Hellwig, M. F. (1987), 'Some recent developments in the theory of competition in markets with adverse selection'. European Economic Review 31, 319-325.
48. Hellwig, M. F. (1988), 'A note on the specification of interfirm communication in insurance markets with adverse selection'. Journal of Economic Theory 46, 154-163.
49. Hermalin, B. and M. Katz (1991), 'Moral hazard and verifiability'. Econometrica 59, 1735-1754.
50. Hirshleifer, J. (1971), 'The private and social value of information and the reward to inventive activity'. American Economic Review 61(4), 561-574.
51. Holmström, B. (1979), 'Moral hazard and observability'. Bell Journal of Economics 10, 74-91.
52. Holmström, B. (1982), 'Moral hazard in teams'. Bell Journal of Economics 13, 324-340.
53. Hoy, M. and M. Polborn (2000), 'The value of genetic information in the life insurance market'. Journal of Public Economics 78(3), 235-252.
54. Hoy, M. and A. Robson (1981), 'Insurance as a giffen good'. Economics Letters 8, 47-51.
55. Hoy, M. and M. Ruse (2005), 'Regulating genetic information in insurance markets'. Risk Management & Insurance Review 8(2), 211-237.
56. Inderst, R. and A. Wambach (2001), 'Competitive insurance markets under adverse selection and capacity constraints'. European Economic Review 45, 1981-1992. (Pubitemid 33071737)
57. Jaynes, G. D. (1978), 'Equilibria in monopolistically competitive insurance markets'. Journal of Economic Theory 19, 394-422.
58. Jewitt, I. (1988), 'Justifying the first-order approach to principal-agent problems'. Econometrica 57, 1177-1190.
59. Khalil, F. C. (1997), 'Auditing without commitment'. RAND Journal of Economics 28, 629-640.
60. Kunreuther, H. and M. Pauly (1985), 'Market equilibrium with private knowledge: An insurance example'. Journal of Public Economics 26, 269-288.
61. Lacker, J. M. and J. A. Weinberg (1989), 'Optimal contracts under costly state falsification'. Journal of Political Economy 97(6), 1345- 1363.
62. Ma, C. T. A. (1994), 'Renegotiation and optimality in agency contracts'. Review of Economic Studies 61, 109-129.
63. Magill, M. and M. Quinzii (1996), Theory of Incomplete Markets, Vol. 1. MIT Press.
64. Malcomson, J. and F. Spinnewyn (1988), 'The multiperiod principalagent problem'. Review of Economic Studies 55, 391-408.
65. Mas-Colell, A., M. D. Whinston, and J. R. Green (1996), Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press.
66. Milgrom, P. and N. Stokey (1982), 'Information, trade and common knowledge'. Journal of Economic Theory 26, 17-27.
67. Mirrlees, J. A. (1971), 'An exploration in the theory of optimal income taxation'. Review of Economic Studies 38(2), 175-208.
68. Miyazaki, H. (1977), 'The rat race and internal labour markets'. Bell Journal of Economics 8, 394-418.
69. Mookherjee, D. and I. Png (1989), 'Optimal auditing, insurance and redistribution'. Quarterly Journal of Economics 104, 399-415.
70. Moore, J. and R. Repullo (1988), 'Subgame perfect implementation'. Econometrica 56, 1191-1220.
71. Mossin, J. (1968), 'Aspects of rational insurance purchasing'. Journal of Political Economy 79, 553-568.
72. Munch, P. and D. Smallwood (1981), 'Theory of solvency regulation in the property and casualty industry'. In: G. Fromm (ed.): Studies in Public Regulation. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 119-180.
73. Myerson, R. B. (1979), 'Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem'. Econometrica 47, 61-73.
74. Peltzman, S. (1975), 'The effects of automobile saftety regulation'. Journal of Political Economy 83, 677-726.
75. Picard, P. (1996), 'Auditing claims in the insurance market with fraud: The credibility issue'. Journal of Public Economics 63, 27-56. (Pubitemid 126160551)
76. Picard, P. (2000), 'Economic analysis of insurance fraud'. In: G. Dionne (ed.): Handbook of Insurance Economics. Boston, pp. 315-362.
77. Radner, R. (1981), 'Monitoring cooperative agreements in a repeated principal-agent relationship'. Econometrica 49(5), 1127-1148.
78. Raviv, A. (1979), 'The design of an optimal insurance policy'. American Economic Review 69, 84-96.
79. Rees, R., H. Gravelle, and A.Wambach (1999), 'Regulation of insurance markets'. Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory 24, 55-68.
80. Riley, J. G. (1979), 'Informational equilibrium'. Econometrica 47, 331-359.
81. Rogerson, W. (1985a), 'The first-order approach to principal-agent problems'. Econometrica 53, 1357-1368.
82. Rogerson, W. (1985b), 'Repeated moral hazard'. Econometrica 53, 69-76.
83. Rosenthal, R. W. and A. Weiss (1984), 'Mixed strategy equilibrium in a market with adverse selection'. Review of Economic Studies 51, 333-342.
84. Rothschild, M. and J. Stiglitz (1976), 'Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: An essay on the economics of imperfect information'. Quarterly Journal of Economics 80, 629-649.
85. Rubinstein, A. and M. E. Yaari (1983), 'Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard'. Journal of Economic Theory 30, 74-97.
86. Schlesinger, H. (1984), 'Optimal insurance for irreplacable commodities'. Journal of Risk and Insurance 51, 131-137.
87. Schlesinger, H. and J. M. Graf v. d. Schulenburg (1987), 'Risk aversion and the purchase of risky insurance'. Journal of Economics 47, 309-314.
88. Smart, M. (2000), 'Competitive insurance markets with two unobservables'. International Economic Review 41(1), 153-169.
89. Spence, M. (1978), 'Product differentiation and performance in insurance markets'. Journal of Public Economics 10, 427-447.
90. Stiglitz, J. (1977), 'Monopoly, non-linear pricing and imperfect information: The insurance market'. Review of Economic Studies 44, 407-430.
91. Strohmenger, R. and A. Wambach (2000), 'Adverse selection and categorical discrimination in the health insurance markets: The effects of genetic tests'. Journal of Health Economics 19(2), 197-218. (Pubitemid 30177261)
92. Sülzle, K. and A. Wambach (2005), 'Insurance in a market for credence goods'. Journal of Risk and Insurance 72, 159-176. (Pubitemid 40465579)
93. Tabarrok, A. (1994), 'Genetic testing: An economic and contractarian analysis'. Journal of Health Economics 13, 75-91. (Pubitemid 24128122)
94. Tennyson, S. (1997), 'Economic institutions and individual ethics: A study of consumer attitudes toward insurance fraud'. Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 32, 247-265. (Pubitemid 127166352)
95. Tirole, J. (1986), 'Hierarchies and bureaucracies: On the role of collusion in organizations'. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 2, 181-214.
96. Townsend, R. M. (1979), 'Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification'. Journal of Economic Theory 21, 265-293.
97. Villeneuve, B. (2003), 'Concurrence et antisélection multidimensionnelle en assurance'. Annales d'économie et de statistique 69, 119- 142.
98. Wambach, A. (2000), 'Introducing heterogeneity in the Rothschild- Stiglitz model'. Journal of Risk and Insurance 67, 579-591.
99. Wilson, C. (1977), 'A model of insurance markets with incomplete information'. Journal of Economic Theory 16, 167-207.
100. Wolinsky, A. (1993), 'Competition in the market for informed expert services'. RAND Journal of Economics 24, 380-398.
101. Zweifel, P., F. Breyer, and M. Kifmann (2007), Health Economics. Springer.