Is honesty the best policy? Curtailing insurance fraud through optimal incentive contracts

Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 106, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 355-375

  Crocker, Keith J ^a   Morgan, John ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000733471     PISSN: 00223808     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/250012     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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