Insurance in a market for credence goods

Journal of Risk and Insurance

Volumn 72, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 159-176

  Sülzle, Kai ^a   Wambach, Achim ^b  

^a IFO INSTITUTE   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ERLANGEN NUREMBERG   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 16244378561     PISSN: 00224367     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0022-4367.2005.00119.x     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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