Auditing claims in the insurance market with fraud: The credibility issue

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 63, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 27-56

  Picard, Pierre ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS OUEST NANTERRE LA DÉFENSE   (France)

^b CEPREMAP   (France)

Author keywords

Audit; Commitment; Credibility; Fraud; Insurance

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030514774     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(95)01569-8     Document Type: Article

References (19)

1. Bond, E.W. and K.J. Crocker, 1993, Hardball and the soft touch: The economics of optimal insurance contract with costly state verification and endogenous monitoring costs, mimeo, Pennsylvania State University.
2. Border, K.C. and J. Sobel, 1987, Samurai accountant: A theory of auditing and plunder, Review of Economic Studies 54, 525-540.
3. Caillaud, B., B. Jullien and P. Picard, 1993, Competing vertical structures: Precommitment and renegotiation, Econometrica 63, no. 3, 621-646.
4. Cummins, J.D. and S. Tennyson, 1994, The tort system: lottery and insurance fraud: Theory and evidence from automobile insurance, mimeo, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
5. Dewatripont, M., 1988, Commitment through renegotiation-proof contracts with third parties, Review of Economic Studies 55, 377-390.
6. Dionne, G. and P. St-Michel, 1991, Worker's compensation and moral hazard, Review of Economics and Statistics, May, 236-244.
7. Dionne, G., P. St-Michel and C. Vanasse, 1992, Moral Hazard, Optimal auditing and workers' compensation, mimeo, University of Montréal.
8. Graetz, M.J., J.F. Reinganum and L.L. Wilde, 1986, The tax compliance game: Toward an interactive theory of law enforcement, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 2, no. 1, 1-32.
9. Melumad, N.D. and D. Mookherjee, 1989, Delegation as commitment: The case of income tax audits, Rand Journal of Economics 20, no. 2, 139-163.
10. Mookherjee, D. and I. Png, 1989, Optimal auditing, insurance and redistribution, Quarterly Journal of Economics 104, 399-415.
11. Mooney, S.F. and J.M. Salvatore, 1990, Insurance fraud project: Report on research, Insurance Information Institute.
12. Picard, P., 1994, Auditing claims in insurance market with fraud, Working paper 9420, CEPREMAP.
13. Picard, P., 1995, On the design of optimal insurance policies under manipulation of audit cost, mimeo.
14. Reinganum, J.F. and L.L. Wilde, 1985, Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework, Journal of Public Economics 26, 1-18.
15. Rothschild, M. and J. Stiglitz, 1976, Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: An essay on the economics of imperfect information, Quarterly Journal of Economics 90, 629-650.
16. Weisberg, H.I. and R.A. Derrig, 1991, Fraud and automobile insurance: A report on the baseline study of bodily injury claims in Massachusetts, Journal of Insurance Regulation 9, 427-451.
17. Weisberg, H.I. and R.A. Derrig, 1992, The system misfired, Best's Review, December, 37-40.
18. Weisberg, H.I. and R.A. Derrig, 1993, Quantitative methods for detecting fraudulent automobile bodily injury claims, mimeo.
19. Wilson, C., 1977, A model of insurance markets with incomplete information, Journal of Economic Theory 16, 167-207.