Hardball and the soft touch: The economics of optimal insurance contracts with costly state verification and endogenous monitoring costs

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 63, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 239-264

  Bond, Eric W ^a   Crocker, Keith J ^b  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Falsification; Fraud; Insurance; Monitoring; Verification

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030642378     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(96)01594-0     Document Type: Article

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