Competitive insurance markets under adverse selection and capacity constraints

European Economic Review

Volumn 45, Issue 10, 2001, Pages 1981-1992

  Inderst, Roman ^a   Wambach, Achim ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Capacity constraints; Competitive equilibrium; Insurance markets

Indexed keywords

INSURANCE INDUSTRY; MARKET CONDITIONS;

EID: 0035165905     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00101-5     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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