Non-discriminating renegotiation in a competitive insurance market

European Economic Review

Volumn 40, Issue 9, 1996, Pages 1717-1736

  Asheim, Geir B ^a   Nilssen, Tore ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OSLO   (Norway)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Insurance market; Non discrimination; Renegotiation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0003070736     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0014-2921(95)00049-6     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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