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GENEVA Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory
Volumn 24, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 29-54
Optimal Insurance Under Random Auditing
Author keywords

Auditing; Insurance; Risk aversion
Indexed keywords

EID: 0038752719     PISSN: 09264957     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1008781131861     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (16)
References (11)
  • 1
    • 0001152529 scopus 로고
    • Regulation, Asymmetric Information and Auditing
    • BARON, D. and BESANKO, D. [1984]: "Regulation, Asymmetric Information and Auditing," Rand Journal of Economics, 15, 447-470.
    • (1984) Rand Journal of Economics , vol.15 , pp. 447-470
    • Baron, D.1    Besanko, D.2
  • 2
    • 0030642378 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Hardball and the Soft Touch: The Economics of Optimal Insurance Contracts with Costly State Verification and Endogenous Monitoring Costs
    • BOND, E.W. and CROCKER, K.J. [1997]: "Hardball and the Soft Touch: The Economics of Optimal Insurance Contracts with Costly State Verification and Endogenous Monitoring Costs," Journal of Public Economics, 63, 239-264.
    • (1997) Journal of Public Economics , vol.63 , pp. 239-264
    • Bond, E.W.1    Crocker, K.J.2
  • 3
    • 33745268062 scopus 로고
    • A Theory of Auditing and Plunder
    • BORDER, K. and SOBEL, J. [1987]: "A Theory of Auditing and Plunder," Review of Economic Studies, 54, 525-540.
    • (1987) Review of Economic Studies , vol.54 , pp. 525-540
    • Border, K.1    Sobel, J.2
  • 5
    • 84946275824 scopus 로고
    • Pareto-Optimal Risk Sharing with Fixed Costs per Claim
    • GOLLIER, C. [1987]: "Pareto-Optimal Risk Sharing with Fixed Costs per Claim," Scandinavian Actuarial Journal, 62-73.
    • (1987) Scandinavian Actuarial Journal , pp. 62-73
    • Gollier, C.1
  • 6
    • 0040819373 scopus 로고
    • A Complete Solution to a Class of Principal-Agent Problems, with an Application to the Control of a Self-Managed Firm
    • GUESNERIE, R. and LAFFONT, J.J. [1984]: "A Complete Solution to a Class of Principal-Agent Problems, with an Application to the Control of a Self-Managed Firm," Journal of Public Economics, 25, 329-369.
    • (1984) Journal of Public Economics , vol.25 , pp. 329-369
    • Guesnerie, R.1    Laffont, J.J.2
  • 9
    • 84959809571 scopus 로고
    • Optimal Auditing Insurance and Redistribution
    • MOOKHERJEE, D. and PNG, I. [1989]: "Optimal Auditing Insurance and Redistribution," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104, 389-415.
    • (1989) Quarterly Journal of Economics , vol.104 , pp. 389-415
    • Mookherjee, D.1    Png, I.2
  • 10
    • 0347054283 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • On the Design of Optimal Insurance Policies under Manipulation of Audit Cost
    • forth-coming
    • PICARD, P. [1999]: "On the Design of Optimal Insurance Policies Under Manipulation of Audit Cost," forth-coming in the International Economic Review.
    • (1999) International Economic Review
    • Picard, P.1
  • 11
    • 0009424011 scopus 로고
    • Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State Verification
    • TOWNSEND, R. [1979]: "Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State Verification," Journal of Economic Theory, 21, 265-293.
    • (1979) Journal of Economic Theory , vol.21 , pp. 265-293
    • Townsend, R.1

* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.