Variation in the monitoring incentives of outside stockholders

Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 49, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 651-680

  Borokhovich, Kenneth A ^a   Brunarski, Kelly ^b   Harman, Yvette S ^b   Parrino, Robert ^c  

^a CLEVELAND STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b MIAMI UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33845744722     PISSN: 00222186     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/505368     Document Type: Article

References (46)

1. Agrawal, Anup, and Gershon N. Mandelker. 1990. "Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 25:143-61.
2. _. 1992. "Shark Repellents and the Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance." Managerial and Decision Economics 13:15-22.
3. Almazan, Andres, Jay C. Hartzell, and Laura T. Starks. 2005. "Active Institutional Shareholders and Costs of Monitoring: Evidence from Executive Compensation." Financial Management 34:5-34.
4. Bethel, Jennifer E., Julia Porter Liebeskind, and Tim Opler. 1998. "Block Share Purchases and Corporate Performance." Journal of Finance 53: 605-34.
5. Bhagat, Sanjai, and Richard H. Jefferies. 1991. "Voting Power in the Proxy Process: The Case of Antitakeover Amendments." Journal of Financial Economics 30:193-225.
6. Borokhovich, Kenneth A., Kelly R. Brunarski, and Robert Parrino. 1997. "CEO Contracting and Antitakeover Amendments." Journal of Finance 52:1495-1517.
7. Borokhovich, Kenneth A., Robert Parrino, and Teresa Trapani. 1996. "Outside Directors and CEO Selection." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 31:377-97.
8. Brickley, James A., Jeffrey L. Coles, and Rory L. Terry. 1994. "Outside Directors and the Adoption of Poison Pills." Journal of Financial Economics 35:371-90.
9. Brickley, James A., Ronald C. Lease, and Clifford W. Smith, Jr. 1988. "Ownership Structure and Voting on Antitakeover Amendments." Journal of Financial Economics 20:267-91.
10. Brown, Stephen J., and Jerold B. Warner. 1985. "Using Daily Stock Returns: The Case of Event Studies." Journal of Financial Economics 14:3-31.
11. Byrd, John W., and Kent A. Hickman. 1992. "Do Outside Directors Monitor Managers? Evidence from Tender Offer Bids." Journal of Financial Economics 32:195-222.
12. Carleton, Willard T., James M. Nelson, and Michael S. Weisbach. 1998. "The Influence of Institutions on Corporate Governance through Private Negotiations: Evidence from TIAA-CREF." Journal of Finance 53:1335-62.
13. Comment, Robert, and G. William Schwert. 1995. "Poison or Placebo? Evidence on the Deterrent Effects of Modern Antitakeover Measures." Journal of Financial Economics 39:3-43.
14. DeAngelo, Harry, and Edward M. Rice. 1983. "Antitakeover Charter Amendments and Shareholder Wealth." Journal of Financial Economics 11 : 329-59.
15. DeBaise, Colleen. 2003. "Analyst Research Settlement with SEC Gets Final Approval." Wall Street Journal, November 3.
16. Del Guercio, Diane. 1996. "The Distorting Effect of the Prudent-Man Laws on Institutional Equity Investments." Journal of Financial Economics 40: 31-62.
17. Del Guercio, Diane, and Jennifer Hawkins. 1999. "The Motivation and Impact of Pension Fund Activism." Journal of Financial Economics 52:293-340.
18. Denis, David J., and Jan M. Serrano. 1996. "Active Investors and Management Turnover Following Unsuccessful Control Contests." Journal of Financial Economics 40:239-66.
19. Fama, Eugene F., and Michael C. Jensen. 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control." Journal of Law and Economics 26:301-25.
20. Gillan, Stuart L., and Laura T. Starks. 2000. "Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder Activism: The Role of Institutional Investors." Journal of Financial Economics 57:275-305.
21. Gordon, Lilli A., and John Pound. 1993. "Information, Ownership Structure, and Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Shareholder-Sponsored Corporate Governance Proposals." Journal of Finance 48:697-718.
22. Huson, Mark R. 1997. "Does Governance Matter? Evidence from CalPERS Interventions." Working paper. Department of Finance and Management Science, University of Alberta, Edmonton.
23. Huson, Mark R., Robert Parrino, and Laura T. Starks. 2001. "Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A Long Term Perspective." Journal of Finance 56:2265-97.
24. Jarrell, Gregg A., and Annette B. Poulsen. 1987. "Shark Repellents and Stock Prices: The Effects of Antitakeover Amendments since 1980." Journal of Financial Economics 19:127-68.
25. Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. 1976. "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure." Journal of Financial Economics 3:305-60.
26. Karpoff, Jonathan M. 1999. "The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Target Companies: A Survey of Empirical Findings." Working paper. Department of Finance and Business Economics, University of Washington, Seattle.
27. Karpoff, Jonathan M., Paul H. Malatesta, and Ralph A. Walkling. 1996. "Corporate Governance and Shareholder Initiatives: Empirical Evidence." Journal of Financial Economics 42:365-95.
28. Knoeber, Charles R. 1986. "Golden Parachutes, Shark Repellents, and Hostile Tender Offers." American Economic Review 76:155-67.
29. Lee, Chun I., Stuart Rosenstein, Nanda Rangan, and Wallace N. Davidson III. 1992. "Board Composition and Shareholder Wealth: The Case of Management Buyouts." Financial Management 21:58-72.
30. Linn, Scott C., and John J. McConnell. 1983. "An Empirical Investigation of the Impact of 'Antitakeover' Amendments on Common Stock Prices." Journal of Financial Economics 11:361-99.
31. Me Williams, Victoria B. 1990. "Managerial Share Ownership and the Stock Price Effects of Antitakeover Amendment Proposals." Journal of Finance 45:1627-40.
32. McWilliams, Victoria B., and Nilanjan S. Sen. 1997. "Board Monitoring and Antitakeover Amendments." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 32:491-505.
33. Mikkelson, Wayne H., and Megan M. Partch. 1997. "The Decline of Takeovers and Disciplinary Managerial Turnover." Journal of Financial Economics 44:205-28.
34. Murphy, Kevin J. 1999. "Executive Compensation." Pp. 3B:2485-2563 in Handbook of Labor Economics, edited by Orly Ashenfelter and David E. Card. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.
35. Parrino, Robert, Richard W. Sias, and Laura T. Starks. 2003. "Voting with Their Feet: Institutional Ownership Changes around Forced CEO Turnover." Journal of Financial Economics 68:3-46.
36. Perry, Tod. 2000. "Incentive Compensation for Outside Directors and CEO Turnover." Working paper. Department of Finance, Arizona State University, Phoenix.
37. Pound, John. 1987. "The Effects of Antitakeover Amendments on Takeover Activity: Some Direct Evidence." Journal of Law and Economics 30: 353-67.
38. _. 1991. "Proxy Voting and the SEC." Journal of Financial Economics 29:241-85.
39. Rosenbaum, Virginia K. 2002. Corporate Takeover Defenses 2002. Washington, D.C.: Investor Responsibility Research Center.
40. Shleifer Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny. 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control." Journal of Political Economy 94:461-88.
41. Smith, Michael P. 1996. "Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from CalPERS." Journal of Finance 51:227-52.
42. Stein, Jeremy C. 1988. "Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia." Journal of Political Economy 96:61-80.
43. Stolz, Rene M. 1988. "Managerial Control of Voting Rights: Financing Policies and the Market for Corporate Control." Journal of Financial Economics 20:25-54.
44. Weisbach, Michael S. 1988. "Outside Directors and CEO Turnover." Journal of Financial Economics 20:431-60.
45. Williamson, Oliver E. 1975. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. New York: Free Press.
46. Yermack David. 1996. "Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors." Journal of Financial Economics 40:185-211.