Value creation or destruction? Hedge funds as shareholder activists

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 14, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 323-336

  Clifford, Christopher P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY   (United States)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Hedge funds; Monitoring; Shareholder activism

Indexed keywords

EID: 50049128677     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.04.007     Document Type: Article

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