Shareholder Activism through Proxy Proposals: The European Perspective

European Financial Management

Volumn 16, Issue 5, 2010, Pages 738-777

  Cziraki, Peter ^a   Renneboog, Luc ^a   Szilagyi, Peter G ^b  

^a TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

corporate governance; G34; sample selection; shareholder activism; shareholder proposals

Indexed keywords

EID: 77958547970     PISSN: 13547798     EISSN: 1468036X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-036X.2010.00559.x     Document Type: Article

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