Corrigendum to "Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring" [Review of Economic Dynamics 10 (2007) 173-192] (DOI:10.1016/j.red.2007.02.002);Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring

Review of Economic Dynamics

Volumn 10, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 173-192

  Fudenberg, Drew ^a   Levine, David K ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Continuous time limit; Diffusion process; Folk theorem; Imperfect monitoring; Repeated games; Repeated moral hazard

Indexed keywords

EID: 33947584070     PISSN: 10942025     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2007.06.001     Document Type: Erratum

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