Optimal indirect and capital taxation

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 70, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 569-587

  Golosov, Mikhail ^a   Kocherlakota, Narayana ^b   Tsyvinski, Aleh ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CAPITAL MARKET; CONSUMPTION BEHAVIOR; STOCHASTICITY; TAX SYSTEM;

EID: 0043269774     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00256     Document Type: Article

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