A theory of brinkmanship, conflicts, and commitments

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 24, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 163-183

  Schwarz, Michael ^a,b   Sonin, Konstantin ^b  

^a YAHOO RESEARCH   (United States)

^b NEW ECONOMIC SCHOOL   (Russian Federation)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 52449103007     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: 14657341     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewm038     Document Type: Article

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