Arms races and negotiations

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 71, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 351-369

  Baliga, Sandeep ^a   Sjöström, Tomas ^b  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARMS RACE; NEGOTIATION PROCESS; THEORETICAL STUDY; WEAPON;

EID: 11144355850     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0034-6527.00287     Document Type: Article

References (28)

1. AUMANN, R. (1990), "Nash Equilibria we Not Self-Enforcing", in J. J. Gabszewicz, J.-F. Richard and L. A. Wolsey (eds.) Economic Decision-Making: Games. Econometrics and Optimization (Amsterdam: Elsevier).
2. AUSTEN-SMITH, D. (1990), "Information Transmission in Debate", American Journal of Political Science, 34, 124-152.
3. BALIGA, S. and MORRIS, S. (2002), "Coordination, Spillovers and Cheap-Talk", Journal of Economic Theory, 105, 450-468.
4. BANKS, J. and CALVERT, R. (1992), "A Battle-of-the-Sexes Game with Incomplete Information", Games and Economic Behavior, 4, 347-372.
5. CARLSSON, H. and VAN DAMME, E. (1993), "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection", Econometrica, 61, 989-1018.
6. CHURCHILL, W. (1931) The World Crisis (abbr. and revised) (New York: C. Scribner).
7. CRAIG, G. (1978) Germany 1866-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press).
8. CRAWFORD, V. and SOBEL, J. (1982), "Strategic Information Transmission", Econometrica, 50, 1431-1451.
9. GREEN, J. and STOKEY, N. (1980), "A Two Person Game of Information Transmission" (H.I.E.R. Discussion Paper No. 751, Harvard University).
10. HARSANYI J. (1973), "Games With Randomly Disturbed Payoffs: A New Rationale for Mixed Strategy Equilibrium Points", International Journal of Game Theory, 2, 1-23.
11. HELLWIG, C. (2001), "Public Information, Private Information and Multiplicity of Equilibria in Coordination Games" (Mimeo, L.S.E.).
12. JERVIS, R. (1976) Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
13. JERVIS, R. (1978), "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma", World Politics, 30, 167-214.
14. KISSINGER, H. (1994) Diplomacy (New York: Touchstone).
15. KYDD, A. (1997), "Game Theory and the Spiral Model", World Politics, 49, 371-400.
16. LEFFLER, M. (1992) A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press).
17. MATTHEWS, S. and POSTLEWAITE, A. (1989), "Pre-play Communication in Two-person Sealed-bid Double Auctions", Journal of Economic Theory, 48, 238-263.
18. METZ, C. (2000), "Public and Private Information in Self-fulfilling Currency Crises" (Mimeo, University of Kassel).
19. MORRIS, S. and SHIN, H. (2002a), "The Social Value of Public Information". American Economic Reviev, 92, 1521-1534.
20. MORRIS, S. and SHIN, H. (2002b), "Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games" (Mimeo, Yale University).
21. MORRIS, S. and SHIN, H. (2003), "Global Games: Theory and Applications" in M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen and S. Turnovsky (eds.) Advances in Economics and Econometrics (Proceedings of the Eighth World Congress of the Econometric Society) (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press).
22. O'NEILL, B. (1999) Honor, Symbols and War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press).
23. REAGAN, R. (1983) Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Ronald Reagan, Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office).
24. RUBINSTEIN, A. (1989), "The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under Almost Common Knowledge", American Economic Review, 79, 385-391.
25. SCHELLING, T. C. (1960) The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
26. SONTAG, R. (1933) European Diplomatic History, 1871-1932 (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts).
27. THUCYDIDES (1972) The History of the Peloponnesian War (London: Penguin Classics).
28. WAINSTEIN, L. (1971), "The Dreadnought Gap", in R. Art and K. Waltz (eds.) The Use of Force (Boston: Little Brown).