The role of information in repeated games with frequent actions

Econometrica

Volumn 78, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 847-882

  Sannikov, Yuliy ^a   Skrzypacz, Andrzej ^b  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Brownian motion; Frequent actions; Imperfect monitoring; Levy decomposition; Poisson process; Repeated games

Indexed keywords

EID: 76549129623     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: 14680262     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3982/ECTA6420     Document Type: Article

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