The slippery slope of concession

Economic Inquiry

Volumn 47, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 197-205

  Hirshleifer, Jack ^a   Boldrin, Michele ^b   Levine, David K ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 68049148654     PISSN: 00952583     EISSN: 14657295     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00154.x     Document Type: Article

References (13)

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