Conflict and deterrence under strategic risk

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 125, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 1821-1858

  Chassang, Sylvain ^a   Miquel, Gerard PadŕO I ^b  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 78649900335     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: 15314650     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/qjec.2010.125.4.1821     Document Type: Article

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