An efficient heuristic approach for security against multiple adversaries

Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 311-318

  Paruchuri, Praveen ^a   Pearce, Jonathan P ^a   Tambe, Milind ^a   Ordonez, Fernando ^a   Kraus, Sarit ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

Bayesian and Stackelberg games; Game theory; Security of agent systems

Indexed keywords

BAYES-NASH EQUILIBRIUMS; BAYESIAN AND STACKELBERG GAMES; BAYESIAN GAMES; CRITICAL ISSUES; HEURISTIC APPROACHES; MIXED INTEGER LINEAR PROGRAMS; MIXED STRATEGIES; MULTI AGENTS; NORMAL FORMS; NP-HARD; OPTIMAL STRATEGIES; SECURITY DOMAINS; SECURITY OF AGENT SYSTEMS;

AGENTS; AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; BAYESIAN NETWORKS; FUZZY CLUSTERING; HEURISTIC METHODS; INTEGER PROGRAMMING; OPTIMAL SYSTEMS;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 60349092268     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1329125.1329344     Document Type: Conference Paper

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