Chapter 51 Inspection games

Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

Volumn 3, Issue , 2002, Pages 1947-1987

  Avenhaus, Rudolf ^a   Von Stengel, Bernhard ^b   Zamir, Shmuel ^c  

^a Institute of Space Technology and Space Applications ISTA   (United Kingdom)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^c HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

arms control; hypothesis testing; inspection game; leadership; recursive game

Indexed keywords

EID: 67649304665     PISSN: 15740005     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03014-X     Document Type: Review

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