Computing the optimal strategy to commit to

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn 2006, Issue , 2006, Pages 82-90

  Conitzer, Vincent ^a   Sandholm, Tuomas ^a  

^a Carnegie Mellon University   (United States)

Author keywords

Bayesian games; Commitment; Game theory; Leadership; Nash equilibrium; Normal form games; Stackelberg

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; GAME THEORY; MATHEMATICAL MODELS;

BAYESIAN GAMES; COMMITMENT; LEADERSHIP; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; NORMAL-FORM GAMES; STACKELBERG;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 33748712836     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1134707.1134717     Document Type: Conference Paper

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