Computing optimal randomized resource allocations for massive security games

Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS

Volumn 2, Issue , 2009, Pages 1062-1069

  Kiekintveld, Christopher ^a   Jain, Manish ^a   Tsai, Jason ^a   Pita, James ^a   Ordóñez, Fernando ^a   Tambe, Milind ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Algorithms; Game theory; Patrolling; Randomization; Risk analysis; Secu rity; Stackelberg games; Uncertainty

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; GAME THEORY; LAW ENFORCEMENT; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; OPTIMIZATION; RISK ANALYSIS; SCHEDULING; SECURITY SYSTEMS;

PATROLLING; RANDOMIZATION; SECU-RITY; STACKELBERG GAMES; UNCERTAINTY;

COMPUTER GAMES;

EID: 84899860443     PISSN: 15488403     EISSN: 15582914     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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