Effective solutions for real-world stackelberg games: When agents must deal with human uncertainties

Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS

Volumn 1, Issue , 2009, Pages 515-522

  Pita, James ^a   Jain, Manish ^a   Ordóñez, Fernando ^a   Tambe, Milind ^a   Kraus, Sarit ^c   Magori Cohen, Reuma ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

Bayesian and stackel berg games; Game theory; Security of agent systems

Indexed keywords

AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; GAME THEORY; INTEGER PROGRAMMING; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS;

AGENT SYSTEMS; BAYESIAN; EMPIRICAL VALIDATION; LIMITED OBSERVATIONS; MIXED INTEGER LINEAR PROGRAM; MULTI-AGENT ALGORITHMS; OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKETS; SECURITY APPLICATION;

ALGORITHMS;

EID: 84899889852     PISSN: 15488403     EISSN: 15582914     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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