Team theory, garbage cans and real organizations: Some history and prospects of economic research on decision-making in organizations

Industrial and Corporate Change

Volumn 12, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 753-787

  Gibbons, Robert ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ACADEMIC RESEARCH; CORPORATE STRATEGY; DECISION MAKING; ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK;

EID: 0042427259     PISSN: 09606491     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/icc/12.4.753     Document Type: Article

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