Coordination and Learning with a Partial Language

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 95, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 1-36

  Blume, Andreas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

Common knowledge; Coordination; Language; Optimal learning

Indexed keywords

EID: 0011906486     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2674     Document Type: Article

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