메뉴 건너뛰기
Journal of Economic Theory
Volumn 133, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 504-523
Decentralized learning from failure
Author keywords

Attainability; Decentralization; Search; Symmetry
Indexed keywords

EID: 33847021972     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.01.005     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (13)
References (15)
  • 1
    • 0036704246 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Spatial dispersion as a dynamic coordination problem
    • Alpern S., and Reyniers D.J. Spatial dispersion as a dynamic coordination problem. Theory Dec. 53 (2002) 29-59
    • (2002) Theory Dec. , vol.53 , pp. 29-59
    • Alpern, S.1    Reyniers, D.J.2
  • 2
    • 0042761768 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Egalitarianism and efficiency in repeated symmetric games
    • Bhaskar V. Egalitarianism and efficiency in repeated symmetric games. Games Econ. Behav. 32 (2000) 247-262
    • (2000) Games Econ. Behav. , vol.32 , pp. 247-262
    • Bhaskar, V.1
  • 3
    • 0011906486 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Coordination and learning with a partial language
    • Blume A. Coordination and learning with a partial language. J. Econ. Theory 95 (2000) 1-36
    • (2000) J. Econ. Theory , vol.95 , pp. 1-36
    • Blume, A.1
  • 4
    • 0000910004 scopus 로고
    • Learning how to cooperate: optimal play in repeated coordination games
    • Crawford V., and Haller H. Learning how to cooperate: optimal play in repeated coordination games. Econometrica 58 (1990) 571-595
    • (1990) Econometrica , vol.58 , pp. 571-595
    • Crawford, V.1    Haller, H.2
  • 5
    • 0001437482 scopus 로고
    • Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite and infinite horizon games
    • Fudenberg D., and Levine D. Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite and infinite horizon games. J. Econ. Theory 31 (1983) 251-268
    • (1983) J. Econ. Theory , vol.31 , pp. 251-268
    • Fudenberg, D.1    Levine, D.2
  • 6
    • 0000663380 scopus 로고
    • The Folk theorem with imperfect public information
    • Fudenberg D., Levine D., and Maskin E. The Folk theorem with imperfect public information. Econometrica 62 (1994) 997-1040
    • (1994) Econometrica , vol.62 , pp. 997-1040
    • Fudenberg, D.1    Levine, D.2    Maskin, E.3
  • 7
    • 0038977183 scopus 로고
    • A Bayesian learning model fitted to a variety of empirical learning curves
    • Jovanovic B., and Nyarko Y. A Bayesian learning model fitted to a variety of empirical learning curves. Brookings Pap. Econ. Act. 1 (1995) 247-299
    • (1995) Brookings Pap. Econ. Act. , vol.1 , pp. 247-299
    • Jovanovic, B.1    Nyarko, Y.2
  • 8
    • 0030365831 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Dynamical focal points in N-Person coordination games
    • Kramarz F. Dynamical focal points in N-Person coordination games. Theory Dec. 40 (1996) 277-313
    • (1996) Theory Dec. , vol.40 , pp. 277-313
    • Kramarz, F.1
  • 9
    • 0032220650 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Consequences of the condorcet jury theorem for beneficial information aggregation by rational agents
    • McLennan A. Consequences of the condorcet jury theorem for beneficial information aggregation by rational agents. Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. 92 (1998) 413-418
    • (1998) Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. , vol.92 , pp. 413-418
    • McLennan, A.1
  • 11
    • 33847076769 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • I. Obara, Private strategy and efficiency: repeated partnership games revisited, Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania, 2000.
  • 12
    • 84960610493 scopus 로고
    • Repeated partnership games with imperfect monitoring and no discounting
    • Radner R. Repeated partnership games with imperfect monitoring and no discounting. Rev. Econ. Stud. 53 (1986) 43-58
    • (1986) Rev. Econ. Stud. , vol.53 , pp. 43-58
    • Radner, R.1
  • 13
    • 84960586032 scopus 로고
    • An example of a repeated partnership game with discounting and with uniformly inefficient equilibria
    • Radner R., Myerson R., and Maskin E. An example of a repeated partnership game with discounting and with uniformly inefficient equilibria. Rev. Econ. Stud. 53 (1986) 59-70
    • (1986) Rev. Econ. Stud. , vol.53 , pp. 59-70
    • Radner, R.1    Myerson, R.2    Maskin, E.3
  • 14
    • 0030352221 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Why are certain properties of binary relations relatively more common in natural language?
    • Rubinstein A. Why are certain properties of binary relations relatively more common in natural language?. Econometrica 64 (1996) 343-355
    • (1996) Econometrica , vol.64 , pp. 343-355
    • Rubinstein, A.1
  • 15

* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.