Algorithmic game theory

Communications of the ACM

Volumn 53, Issue 7, 2010, Pages 78-86

  Roughgarden, T I M ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMIC GAME THEORY; ALGORITHMS AND COMPLEXITY; ALLOCATION ALGORITHM; MIXED STRATEGY; NASH EQUILIBRIUM;

COMPUTER APPLICATIONS; GAME THEORY; PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS;

ALGORITHMS;

EID: 77953926975     PISSN: 00010782     EISSN: 15577317     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1145/1785414.1785439     Document Type: Review

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