Algorithmic game theory: Some greatest hits and future directions

IFIP International Federation for Information Processing

Volumn 273, Issue , 2008, Pages 21-42

  Roughgarden, Tim ^a  

^a Stanford University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; GAME THEORY;

ALGORITHMIC GAME THEORY; THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE;

COMPUTER SCIENCE;

EID: 48249127226     PISSN: 15715736     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-0-387-09680-3_2     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (137)

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