Computer science and game theory

Communications of the ACM

Volumn 51, Issue 8, 2008, Pages 75-79

  Shoham, Yoav ^a  

^a Stanford University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; COMPUTER SCIENCE; COMPUTERS; DECISION MAKING; ECONOMIC ANALYSIS; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; INFORMATION THEORY; PROGRAM INTERPRETERS; TECHNOLOGY;

COMPUTER PROGRAMS; E-COMMERCE; INTEGRAL PART; RECURSIVE MODELING; REPEATED GAMES;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 48249088617     PISSN: 00010782     EISSN: 15577317     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1145/1378704.1378721     Document Type: Review

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