A strategic theory of the firm as a nexus of incomplete contracts: A property rights approach

Journal of Management

Volumn 36, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 806-826

  Kim, Jongwook ^a   Mahoney, Joseph T ^b  

^a WESTERN WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

Dynamic capabilities; Entrepreneurship; Incomplete contracts; Property rights

Indexed keywords

EID: 77953516822     PISSN: 01492063     EISSN: 15571211     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0149206310363731     Document Type: Article

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