Resource-based and property rights perspectives on value creation: the case of oil field unitization

Managerial and Decision Economics

Volumn 23, Issue 4-5, 2002, Pages 225-245

  Kim, Jongwook ^a   Mahoney, Joseph T ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 3142545155     PISSN: 01436570     EISSN: 10991468     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/mde.1063     Document Type: Article

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