The economics of franchising

The Economics of Franchising

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 1-338

  Blair, Roger D ^a   Lafontaine, Francine ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84925194420     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511753879     Document Type: Book

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