Do boards affect performance? Evidence from corporate restructuring

Journal of Business

Volumn 78, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 1403-1431

  Perry, Tod ^a   Shivdasani, Anil ^b  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 27644564183     PISSN: 00219398     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/430864     Document Type: Article

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