Are some outside directors better than others? Evidence from director appointments by Fortune 1000 firms

Journal of Business

Volumn 78, Issue 5, 2005, Pages 1943-1971

  Fich, Eliezer M ^a  

^a DREXEL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 23944436026     PISSN: 00219398     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/431448     Document Type: Review

References (36)

1. Agrawal, A., and C. Knoeber. 1999. Outside directors, politics, and firm performance. Unpublished manuscript, Culverhouse College of Business, University of Alabama.
2. Altman, Edward I. 1968. Financial ratios, discriminant analysis, and the prediction of corporate bankruptcy. Journal of Finance 23:589-609.
3. Antilla S. 1993. Former Apple chairman causes a stir in new job. New York Times (October 19).
4. Bacon, J., and J. Brown. 1974. Corporate directorships practices: Role, selection and legal status of the board. The Conference Board and the American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc., New York.
5. Booth, J. R., and D. N. Deli. 1996. Factors affecting the number of outside directorships held by CEOs. Journal of Financial Economics 40:81-104.
6. _. 1999. On executives of financial institutions as outside directors. Journal of Corporate Finance 5:227-50.
7. Brickley, J. A., J. S. Linck, and J. L. Coles. 1999. What happens to CEOs after they retire? New evidence on career concerns, horizon problems, and CEO incentives. Journal of Financial Economics 52:341-77.
8. Chevalier, J., and G. Ellison. 1999. Are some mutual fund managers better than others? Cross-sectional patterns in behavior and performance? Journal of Finance 54, no. 3:875-99.
9. De Long, J. B. 1991. Did J.P. Morgan's men add value? An Economist's perspective on financial capitalism. In Inside the business enterprise: Historical perspectives on the use of information, ed. Peter Temin. National Bureau of Economic Research conference report. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
10. Dodd, P., and J. B. Warner. 1983. On corporate governance: A study of proxy contests. Journal of Financial Economics 11:401-38.
11. Fama, E. F. 1980. Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy 88:288-35.
12. Fama, E. F. and M. Jensen. 1983. The separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics 26:301-25.
13. Ferris, S. P., M. Jagannathan, and A. C. Pritchard. 2003. Too busy to mind the business? Monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments. Journal of Finance 58, no. 3: 1087-1111.
14. Gilson, S. 1990. Bankruptcy, boards, banks, and blockholders. Journal of Financial Economics 27:355-87.
15. Hermalin, B., and M. Weisbach. 1988. The determinants of board composition. RAND Journal of Economics 19:589-606.
16. _. 1997. Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO. American Economic Review 88:96-118.
17. Hallock, K. 1997. Reciprocally interlocking boards of directors and executive compensation. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 32, no. 3:331-44.
18. Kaplan, S., and D. Reishus. 1990. Outside directorships and corporate performance. Journal of Financial Economics 27:389-410.
19. Klein, A. 1998. Firm performance and board committee structure. Journal of Law and Economics 41, no. 1:275-303.
20. Kroszner, R. S., and P. E. Strahan. 2001. Bankers on boards: Monitoring, conflicts of interest, and lender liability. Journal of Financial Economics 62:415-52.
21. Laderman, J. M. 1994. The hauls of ivy. Business Week (July 4).
22. Lorsch, J., and E. MacIver. 1989. Pawns or potentates: The reality of America's corporate boards. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
23. Mace, M. 1986. Directors: Myth and reality. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
24. Pellet, J. 1998. The great seating debate. Chief Executive 132:40-42.
25. Rajan, R., and L. Zingales. 2000. The governace of the new enterprise. In Corporate governance, ed. X. Vives. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
26. Ramirez, C. D. 1995. Did J.P. Morgan's men add liquidity? Corporate investment, cash flow, and financial structure at the turn of the twentieth century. Journal of Finance 2:661-78.
27. Rosen, S. 1981. The economics of superstars. American Economic Review 5:845-58.
28. Rosenstein, S., and J. Wyatt. 1990. Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth. Journal of Financial Economics 26:175-91.
29. _. 1994. Shareholder wealth effects when an officer joins the board of directors of another. Managerial and Decision Economics 15:317-27.
30. Sandler, N., and A. Weintraub. 2000. Nothing mellow at Yellowave. Business Week (October 23):54.
31. Shivdasani, A. 1993. Board composition, ownership structure and hostile takeovers. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16:167-98.
32. Shivdasani, A., and D. Yermack. 1999. CEO involvement in the selection of new board members: An empirical analysis. Journal of Finance 54-55:1829-53.
33. Smith, C. W., and R. L. Watts. 1992. The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies. Journal of Financial Economics 32, 263-92.
34. Vancil, R. 1987. Passing the baton: Managing the process of CEO succession. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
35. Westphal, J. D., and E. J. Zajac. 1997. Defections from the inner circle: Social exchange, reciprocity, and the diffusion of board independence in U.S. corporations. Administrative Science Quarterly 42:161-83.
36. Zingales, L. 2000. In search of new foundations. Journal of Finance 55, no. 4:1623-53.