Price of anarchy for greedy auctions

Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 537-553

  Lucier, B ^a   Borodin, A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMMERCE; GAME THEORY;

BAYES-NASH EQUILIBRIUM; COMBINATORIAL AUCTION; DETERMINISTIC MECHANISM; FULL INFORMATION GAME; GREEDY APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS; INCOMPLETE INFORMATION; PURE NASH EQUILIBRIUM; UNSPLITTABLE FLOW PROBLEMS;

APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS;

EID: 77951686051     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1137/1.9781611973075.46     Document Type: Conference Paper

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