Bayesian combinatorial auctions

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 5125 LNCS, Issue PART 1, 2008, Pages 820-832

  Christodoulou, George ^a   Kovács, Annamária ^b   Schapira, Michael ^c  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR INFORMATICS   (Germany)

^b GOETHE UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^c HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BAYESIAN NETWORKS; CHLORINE COMPOUNDS; COMMERCE; GAME THEORY; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; LINGUISTICS; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION; TRANSLATION (LANGUAGES);

BAYESIAN; BAYESIAN NASH EQUILIBRIUM; COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS; INFORMATION GAMES; SOCIAL WELFARE; VALUATION FUNCTION;

PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS;

EID: 49149115507     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-70575-8_67     Document Type: Conference Paper

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